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Abstract
Turkish Electricity Market Law (EML) came into force in 2001 aiming at 
establishing a financially strong, stable, transparent and competitive 
electricity market based on bilateral contracts. Also, a balancing and 
settlement system (BSS) was put into practice in November 2004 to create a 
market where uncontracted generation can be traded, and actual 
implementation of the BSS started on August, 1st 2006 following a 21-month 
virtual implementation period. However, BSS has always been criticized from 
its beginning as transferring excessive profits to private generation 
companies. The present paper analyzes the implementation of BSS and 
argues that current BSS not only undermines the healthy development of the 
electricity market in Turkey but also prevents power investments due to 
uncertainties it created. It concludes that since the inconsistency between the 
objectives of EML and results of BSS in practice is obvious, Turkish policy 
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2makers need to modify current electricity market policy in line with 
suggestions presented in the paper.
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1. Introduction
On March 3, 2001, Electricity Market Law (EML, No. 4628) came into force 
and aimed at establishing a financially strong, stable, transparent and 
competitive electricity market in Turkey. In line with new law, vertically 
integrated Turkish electricity corporation (TEAS) was restructured to form 
three new state-owned public enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity 
Transmission Co. (TEIAS), Electricity Generation Co. (EUAS) and Turkish 
Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. (TETAS). The new law also created 
an autonomous regulatory body. So, a major electricity market reform 
program was initiated in Turkey. The reform program entails privatization, 
liberalization as well as a radical restructuring of the whole electricity
industry. EML includes the following key elements [1]:
 An autonomous Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), 
governed by its independent board, 
 A licensing framework for market participants, 
 An energy market based on bilateral contracts between market 
participants,
 Eligible consumer concept to ensure freedom for eligible consumers to 
choose their suppliers.
                                                                                                                                         
The views, findings and conclusions expressed in this article are entirely those of the author 
and do not represent in any way the views of any institution he is affiliated with.
3EMRA has started to work immediately after its appointment on November
19, 2001. In March 2004, Turkish High Planning Council adopted Electricity 
Sector Strategy Paper with a road map aiming at sector reform. According to 
the strategy paper, “The liberal market structure to be implemented in Turkey 
is based on bilateral contracting between buyers and sellers, 
complemented by a balancing & settlement mechanism. To achieve the 
objectives and principles of this strategy it is essential that the balancing & 
settlement regime acts as a market where uncontracted generation can be 
bought and sold and the application enhances security of supply by 
facilitating participation of independent and small generators … Balancing 
and settlement mechanism will involve the target for establishment of a spot 
market and will include signals to attract new investments”.
As referred in Strategy Paper of March 2004, one of the primary components 
of this reform process is what is called “balancing and settlement system”
(BSS), referring to a system consisting of activities related with real-time 
balancing the demand and supply through acceptance of bids and offers, 
financial settlement of payables and receivables arising from energy supplied 
to or withdrawn from the system. BSS was put into practice on November 3rd, 
2004 by a regulation published in Turkish Official Gazette No. 25632. 
However, actual implementation of the system started on August, 1st 2006 
upon an EMRA decision (dated July 20th, 2006, No.831) following a 21-month 
virtual implementation period. However, BSS has always been criticized from 
its beginning as transferring excessive profits to private generation 
companies. Although there exists a huge literature on electricity wholesale 
markets; to the best of our knowledge, so far, no scholar has studied and 
4analyzed Turkish electricity wholesale market in general and Turkish
balancing and settlement system in particular. The present paper aims at 
filling this gap in the literature. Since it is obvious that BSS will have 
important implications for the future of the reform process, the present article 
constitutes an important contribution not only to the existing literature but also 
to the electricity market policy formulation process in Turkey. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents theoretical 
fundamentals. Section 3 provides an overview of current balancing and 
settlement system in Turkey. Section 4 critically analyzes the balancing and 
settlement system in Turkey and lists some policy suggestions to improve 
current framework. The final section concludes.
2. Theoretical fundamentals
Terms such as “pools”, “power exchanges”, “spot-markets”, “day-ahead 
markets” and so on are many different ways of classifying the prevailing 
concepts of wholesale electricity trading. Generally speaking, electricity 
market models can be classified into two broad categories: single-price 
market models and dual price market models.  In single-price markets, there 
is only real time balancing market and bilateral contracts market rarely exists. 
On the other hand, in dual-price markets, there are day-ahead market and 
real time balancing market in addition to bilateral contracts market.
52.1. Single-price market models
In single-price markets, there is only real time balancing market and bilateral 
contracts market hardly exists. Single-price markets bundle the energy 
transaction price with the energy transmission price in that a single price for 
energy delivered (or produced) including all system operation costs. In dual-
price markets on the other hand the price for the commodity (the energy 
transacted) is separated from the price/cost of the transmission and system 
operation. Single-price market concepts are in nature unit-oriented and 
centrally dispatched, and are the closest to pre-deregulation electricity 
structures.
Criticisms of single-price markets often point out the lack of demand-side 
participation. This is due to the absence of a day-ahead price signal that is 
required for industrial and commercial load in order to plan load curtailment. 
The single-price markets are used in developing countries where the 
government needs to have strong control of the generation and transmission 
assets – such as most Latin-American countries. With little demand-side 
response and centrally controlled utilization of governmental or private owned 
generation assets, controlled pricing and tariffs plays a very important role. 
Examples of single-price markets are the Alberta and Ontario markets; the 
majority of the Latin-American markets – Brazil, Chile, and Argentina; New 
Zealand and Australia, Korea and Singapore. Examples of single-price 
markets with bilateral contracts are Texas market – ERCOT, and the new UK 
market NETA/BETA.
62.2. Dual-price market models
In dual-price markets, there are day-ahead market and real time balancing 
market in addition to bilateral contracts market and the price for the 
commodity (the energy transacted) is separated from the price/cost of the 
transmission and system operation. Dual-price market model can be further 
classified as centrally dispatched dual-price price markets and self-
dispatched dual-price markets. 
Centrally dispatched markets are characterized by a close integration 
between system operation and the electricity markets. In most cases, the 
system and market operator are the same organization. In this respect these 
markets resembles the single-price markets to a large extent. However, 
these models employ more market features such as forwards and day-ahead 
markets; and markets for various ancillary services. The argued benefit of 
such models is that it is the – at least in theory – the most cost-effective 
structure, since a centralized, independent entity utilizes all units in the most 
optimal manner. The criticism towards such markets is towards the 
complexity and cost of the construct. Examples of this concept are the US 
markets; PJM, New York, New England, Midwest ISO and California.
In self-dispatched markets there is a clear separation between the market 
operator and the system operator. The market operator organizes various 
kinds of markets for energy transactions, such as derivatives/forwards, day-
ahead and intra-day markets. The system operator is not concerned by the 
contractual transaction of energy – although need to have information of the 
7contracted schedules; but is responsible for electricity balancing and for 
system reliability and security. The system operator will, in most cases, 
operate markets for some of the required ancillary services such as 
balancing power and capacity reserves.
With unit-based markets is meant that the energy bids and offers are directly 
related to physical units (generating units and load units/aggregates). In 
addition to the energy offers and bids (e.g. price per MWh willing to produce 
or consume), the market participants must submit parameters describing 
operating conditions for the units; such as minimum runtime, ramp rates, 
startup costs etc. The market operator will use these parameters when 
calculating the market clearing price and corresponding schedules. Examples 
of unit-oriented markets are Spain/Portugal, Italy and Japan.
The most decentralized market structure is a fully portfolio-based concept. 
Here the market participants transact energy on long-term or day-ahead 
based on their total energy portfolio. The market structure requires that all 
market participants connected to the central grid as controlled by the system 
operator have a balanced portfolio. This implies that for each participant own 
generation and procurement must balance the sum of consumption and 
sales. The market operator has no interest or influence in the actual unit 
commitment and scheduling of individual units – that is left to the market 
participants to handle. Contracts concluded in the day-ahead market are 
binding, and although the system operator can not change the day-ahead 
schedules, any deviations from the contracted schedules and real-time 
operation will be rebalanced by the system operator. Any real-time deviation 
8or system operational issues are handled by the independent system 
operator(s), which may organize separate markets for procuring balancing 
power, capacity reserves and other ancillary services. Examples of this 
market structure are the prevailing European markets; including NordPool, 
France, Germany, Austria, Poland, Slovenia and Romania. Emerging 
markets such as South Africa countries seems to lean towards this concept.
Figure 1 presents the classification of electricity market models, current 
Turkish model and final targeted model1. Turkey aims at transforming its 
current single price market with bilateral contracts into a portfolio based self-
dispatched dual price electricity market.
[ Figure 1 goes here ]
Streckiene et al. [2], Rabiee et al. [3], Diongue et al. [4], Druce [5], Lee and 
Lee [6], Cuaresma et al. [7] present different implementation of electricity 
market models around the world.
3. Current balancing and settlement system in Turkey
The final Turkish electricity wholesale market is expected to consist of (1) 
bilateral contracts markets between the market participants, (2) an organized 
day-ahead market, operated by market operator (TEIAS/MFSC), (3) a real-
time system balancing and operational mechanism by the system operator 
(TEIAS/NLDC), (4) an organized market for financially settled electricity 
contracts, (5) one or more organized markets for procurement of ancillary 
9services. Table 1 compares current and expected Turkish wholesale 
electricity market structures. 
[ Table 1 goes here ]
In Turkey, National Load Dispatch Center (TEIAS/NLDC) is the unit under the 
body of TEIAS in charge of real-time balancing of electricity demand and 
supply. Market Financial Settlement Center (TEIAS/MFSC) is another unit of 
TEIAS that operates the settlement side of balancing and settlement system 
by calculating amounts payable or receivable by legal entities operating in 
the market, based on differences between actual purchases and sales as a 
result of the real time physical balancing of energy supply and demand by 
TEIAS/NLDC.
At present, the market participants are composed of licensed legal entities 
that supply energy to the system or withdrawn energy from the system 
through participating in the balancing mechanism and/or their short and/or 
long energy positions. Current market participants include:
 Generation licensees,
 Autoproducer and autoproducer group licensees,
 Wholesale licensees, 
 Retail licensees.
The market participants are obligated to register with TEIAS/MFSC within 
one month following the effective date of their licenses. TEIAS/MFSC is 
authorized as the market operator and TEIAS/NLDC as the system operator.
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Balancing mechanism participants submit separate bid and offer prices for 
each settlement period (daytime, peak and night) twice a month. Until 14:30 
every day, they are also required to present physical notifications covering 
the 24 (twenty four) hour period between 00:00 and 24:00 hours before the 
day physical notifications are made for. Balancing of demand and supply for 
day ahead scheduling activities and real time is achieved by evaluation of 
bids and offers and acceptance of appropriate bids and offers by 
TEIAS/NLDC. The bids and offers are evaluated with regard to the following 
criteria:
 Transmission and distribution constraints,
 Technical constraints of balancing mechanism entities,
 Bid and offer prices submitted for balancing mechanism entities.
Bids and offers that are accepted by TEIAS/NLDC are transformed into the 
corresponding loading and de-loading instructions and issued to relevant 
balancing mechanism participants.
The current day ahead scheduling process realized by the system operator is
described above; however, due to space limitations, projected market 
structure for the final Turkish wholesale electricity market is presented in 
Figure 2 [8].
[ Figure 2 goes here ]
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4. Critical analysis and policy suggestions
It seems that Turkey targets self-dispatched and portfolio based dual price 
market model as the final market design of her wholesale electricity market 
and will continue to modify its current model in line with final target. The 
reasons for the selection of this model may be summarized as follows. First 
of all, global experience from various markets strongly indicates that demand 
side participation and demand side price elasticity is far more developed in 
decentralized market models based on self-scheduling than centrally 
dispatched markets. Second, price calculation in portfolio-based markets with 
one or few market prices is much easier to verify and understand by the 
market participants. Third, local optimization of own resources promotes 
innovation and better utilization on the market participant level, as opposed to 
on a national level. In a competitive market, it’s important to emphasize on 
the market participants maximum ability to utilize and handle their own 
resources by clever planning, operation and investments. Fourth, portfolio-
based market structure leads naturally into derivatives markets for risk 
management. Since the day-ahead market is portfolio (e.g. contract) based, 
the risk aspect is also more “contract” based, and it’s thus easier to design 
standard products in the forwards markets. Fifth, simplicity and transparency 
in calculating the market clearing prices will be important to establish 
confidence to the market among the participants. Price determination is 
based on fundamental economic concept of intersection of supply and 
demand curves which is easy to explain and understand for everybody. In the 
initial phases of the market, one may assume that the participants will have 
limited experience and resources to handle complex pricing and trading 
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rules, so simplification of pricing calculation is an important issue. Sixth, dual 
price, i.e. introduction of day ahead market, incentivizes demand side 
participation in the market which ultimately will lead to price stability and 
contribute to security of supply. Seventh, portfolio based self-dispatch will 
provide a tool for market participants to trade for balance before the delivery 
time. Accordingly, this will provide a comfortable environment for the system 
operator to manage system and to balance only real-time deviations. And 
finally, this market model is a proven one in prevailing European countries.
As we know in a competitive market an increase in demand is followed by a 
corresponding increase in supply; that is, seasonal price increase caused by 
supply shortages result in an increase in investment, which in turn provides 
an increase in supply, a decrease in price and finally price stability. In short, 
price is expected to follow demand in competitive markets. So, price increase
is unavoidable if supply is fixed while demand increases. In electricity 
markets, however, supply is almost fixed in short and even medium terms as 
power investments require a long time span to complete. Therefore, demand 
forecasts are crucial in electricity markets. Without healthy and accurate 
estimates that project any demand increase at least 5 years ago, it is almost 
impossible to prevent price increases in any electricity market based on free 
competition. This is where actually problem lies in Turkey.
In Turkey, supply shortages leads to electricity purchases in balancing
market (a kind of spot market2) by system operator within balancing and 
settlement framework as described in previous sections. Since in Turkey 
demand forecasts are not reliable3, necessary investments could not be done 
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and even at present level of investment is not high enough to cover present 
and future demand. So, frequently, Turkish system operator is forced to 
purchase electricity from spot market, which together with actual 
implementation of balancing and settlement system directly results in high 
prices. Table 2 presents the evolution of wholesale prices in Turkish 
electricity market in national currency (YKr/kWh) since the beginning of 
actual implementation of balancing and settlement system [9]. In Table 2, 
system imbalance price is the weighted average of hourly system marginal 
prices for each settlement period (daytime, peak and night) in a month; and 
Turkish average electricity wholesale price is a reference price determined by 
EMRA that is used in determination of retail electricity prices. 
[ Table 2 goes here ]
Figure 3 shows the evolution of wholesale prices in Turkish electricity market 
in national currency (YKr/kWh). As can be seen in Figure 3, system 
imbalance price is almost always higher than the Turkish average electricity 
wholesale price. The difference between spot price and average electricity 
wholesale price is reflected in accounts of public distribution (TEDAS) and 
wholesale companies (TETAS) as a loss. Government accepts these losses
to keep electricity prices low.
[ Figure 3 goes here ]
Another vital result of the actual implementation of balancing and settlement 
system is the fact that it caused an important decrease in the volume of 
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bilateral contracts. Since prices emerged in spot market are mostly higher 
than those determined between private parties (that is, between buyers and 
sellers), private generation firms have preferred to cancel their power sale 
agreements and sell electricity they produced in spot market. As can be seen 
in Figure 3, system imbalance price was about 11-13 YKr/kWh in August 
2006 when balancing and settlement system was initiated. In the course of 
time, price increased by more than 35% and exceeded 18 YKr/kWh. 
Therefore, most private generators prefer to sell their electricity in spot 
market rather than to a private third party. Table 3 and Figure 4 demonstrate 
the evolution of the share of bilateral contracts in total electricity transactions 
in Turkish wholesale market from September 2006 to May 2008. Figure 5 on 
the other hand illustrates the evolution of transactions based on bilateral 
contracts [9].
[ Table 3 goes here ]
[ Figure 4 goes here ]
[ Figure 5 goes here ]
Figure 4 and Figure 5 clearly indicate that there exists a decrease in the 
volume of electricity trade based on bilateral contracts in both actual and 
relative terms. The share of transactions based on bilateral contracts within 
total transactions decreased about 50% and actual trade volume based on 
bilateral contracts reduced by 38%. Moreover, the number of connection 
points based on bilateral contracts (that is the number of eligible consumers 
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actively taking part in the market) decreased almost by one fourth! (from 799 
to 215). So at present Turkish market seems like a pool model with a single 
buyer rather than a competitive market with bilateral contracts.
Within this context, there is another interesting point to mention. In Turkey, 
power generation from renewable sources are encouraged and the Law on 
Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources for the Purpose of Generating 
Electrical Energy (Law no. 5346, dated 10 May 2005) lets purchasing of 
electricity from renewable energy sources with a higher price. According to it, 
until the end of 2011, the applicable price for the electricity produced from 
renewable sources is between 5 and 5.5 Eurocent/kWh [10]. However, since 
even this subsidized price4 is about 35% below the one emerged in spot 
market, private power plants based on renewable sources prefer to sell 
electricity they produced in spot market. This situation illustrates how high the 
prices are in the spot market. 
At this point, let me focus on the apparent conflict between new Electricity 
Market Law (EML, No. 4628) that aims at establishing a competitive 
electricity market based on bilateral contracts and current balancing and 
settlement system (BSS) that causes the number of bilateral contracts to 
radically decline. Current BSS undermines the objectives specified in EML by 
preventing bilateral trading as specified above. If continued to be 
implemented unaltered, BSS will eliminate almost all private electricity sale 
agreements in less than a year. 
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Actually, Turkey faces a dilemma. On the one hand, she is not able to 
increase the level of electricity investments due to reasons mentioned 
elsewhere [11]. However, on the other hand, she also desires not to 
implement any power cut while demand rises. Among the apparent results of 
this dilemma are rising prices and supply shortages. Furthermore, a true 
competitive market based on bilateral trading requires a surplus capacity that 
is open to negotiation among buyers and sellers. But in Turkish case 
although there exists a supply shortage (let alone surplus capacity!), Turkey 
still tries to set up a market based on bilateral trading! To be at least 
consistent, Turkey has following two options. First, Turkey continues to 
implement existing BSS but accepts to pay for high electricity prices. In such 
a case, she must also be ready to convert its market structure into one based 
on a pool with single buyer. Second, Turkey gives up current BSS to avoid 
high prices but in this case she should implement some power cuts at least in 
the short run to compensate for the supply shortage. The best option for 
Turkey may be the following. In the short run, Turkey determines a maximum 
price expressed as a percentage of Turkish average electricity wholesale 
price (TAEWP) that specifies the upper limit of BSS prices. For instance, it 
may be stated that BSS prices cannot exceed 150% of TAEWP. If BSS 
prices are within this limit, Turkey continues to implement BSS. When they 
exceed the limit, Turkey implements power cuts within a program. In this 
option, Turkey needs temporarily to convert its market model into pool model 
with single buyer. In the medium and long term, Turkey should encourage 
power investments in a large scale and when a surplus capacity is created 
she should abolish upper limit for BSS prices immediately and transform its 
market into competitive one with bilateral trade. Nuclear power plant projects 
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with capacities expressed in thousand MWs are perfect candidates for 
investment options for Turkey [12]. While implementing such a policy, Turkey 
should keep in mind the final aim of creating a competitive market where 
private parties freely trade electricity. Therefore, she should avoid public 
investments and any means that may result in an increased activity of public 
firms in the market.
Since we offer a pool model for Turkey in the short term and a competitive 
market based on bilateral contracts in the medium and long terms let me 
focus on the perceived advantages and disadvantages of both the pool and 
the bilateral contract models of power trading. A competitive electricity pool is 
often created on the basis of an existing cooperation agreement between 
various utilities. Its conversion to operation on a competitive basis will 
therefore be less of a revolution than the creation of a completely new 
structure. Some of the concerns that accompany the introduction of 
competition may be alleviated by the somewhat less radical nature of the 
change. A pool provides a much more centralized form of system 
management. Not only does it handle all the physical electricity transactions 
but it usually also assumes the responsibility for operating the transmission 
system. This combination of roles avoids the multiplication of organizations 
but makes it more difficult to distinguish between the various functions that 
need to be performed in an electricity market. Moreover, most small and 
medium electricity consumers have very little incentive to take an active part 
in an electricity market. Even when they are aggregated, the retailer that 
represents them has no direct means of adjusting consumption in response 
to changes in prices. One might therefore argue that the transaction costs 
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could be reduced significantly if the demand is deemed to be passive and is 
represented by a load forecast in an electricity pool. Actually we are unhappy 
with this approach because we feel that direct negotiations between 
consumers and producers are essential if efficient prices are to be reached. 
We strongly propose that the pool model should ultimately be replaced by a 
competitive market simply because pools are only administered 
approximations of a market and not true markets. Furthermore, pools also 
provide a mechanism for reducing the scheduling risk faced by generators 
and hence, hopefully, the cost of electrical energy. When a generator sells 
energy on the basis of simple bids for each market period separately, it runs 
the risk that for some periods it may not have sold enough energy to keep the 
plant on-line. At that point, it must decide whether to sell energy at a loss to 
keep the unit running or to shut it down and face the expense of another 
start-up at a later time. Either option increases the cost of producing energy 
with this unit and forces the generator to raise its average bid price. If this 
generator trades in a pool that operates on the basis of complex bids, the 
rules of this pool probably ensure that it recovers the start-up and no-load 
components of its bid. Besides, the scheduling algorithm implemented by the
pool usually tries to avoid unnecessary shutdowns. Since these factors 
reduce the risks faced by the generators, one would expect that they should 
foster lower average prices. This reduction in risk, however, comes at the 
price of an increase in the complexity of the pool rules. More complex rules 
reduce the transparency of the price setting process and increase 
opportunities for price manipulations. In practice, it is not clear whether
complex bids and pool-based scheduling actually lower electricity prices.
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5. Conclusion
Since the inconsistency between the objectives of EML and results of BSS in 
practice is obvious, Turkish policy makers need to modify current electricity 
market policy. As in the case in any policy, Turkish energy policy should save 
not just today but also the future. Current system may prevent power cuts 
today but who can answer the following question within current framework: 
Imagine that a new 3,000 MW nuclear power plant is constructed; will it sell
electricity it generated in balancing market? Or, do private investors invest in 
such a power plant by just depending on volatile and unpredictable BSS 
prices? In short, current system undermines the healthy development of the 
electricity market in Turkey and prevents power investments due to 
uncertainties it created. We offered a solution to this problem in previous 
section. This or any other consistent model should replace current 
inconsistent one as soon as possible.
The energy industry is a complex one; and the creation of a wholesale 
market for electricity, where none previously existed, is no easy task. Not 
surprisingly, there will be problems but most of them will disappear with the 
growth of more effective competition. If reforms are practiced by taking into 
account their underlying economic logic, there is no reason not to believe that 
the domestic and foreign investors will be greatly interested in entering a 
market with excellent growth potential, like Turkish power market.
As no meaningful competition has developed so far in Turkish wholesale 
market, a significant amount of work still lies ahead. It should not be forgotten 
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that the true test of success comes in the form of whether a structure in 
which generators, suppliers, customers and other actors in the market can all 
freely negotiate, each taking their own view of the prices, risks, opportunities 
and threats that a competitive market offers is created or not.
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Footnotes
                                                
1 The technical information in this section is collected from various books, papers and notes 
that are published or not.
2 Current balancing market might be regarded as a “managed spot market”. This mechanism 
is a market because the energy that is used to achieve the balance is freely offered by the 
participants at a price of their own choosing. It is a spot market because it determines the 
price at which imbalances are settled. However, it is also a managed market because the 
bids and offers are selected by a third party (the system operator) rather than through 
bilateral deals.
3 For more information on electricity demand forecasts in Turkey, see [13].
4 5.5 Eurocent equals to about 11.5 YKr at current exchange rates.
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Table 1. Current and expected Turkish wholesale electricity market structure
Feature Current Market Projected Market
Demand-Side Participation No Yes
Bilateral Contracts Market Yes Yes
Day-Ahead Operation Day-Ahead Planning 
by System Operator
(NLDC)
Day-Ahead Spot Market 
(DAM)
Day-Ahead Participants Big generators only 
(mandatory)
All generators, Wholesalers, 
Retailers, Eligible 
Consumers, Autoproducers, 
Industrial Load (Voluntary)
Real Time Balancing Yes Yes
System Imbalance Price
(SIP)
Weighted Average of 
Hourly System 
Marginal Prices (3 
prices/month)
System Marginal Price 
(Hourly)
Spot Price SIP Marginal Prices in Day-
Ahead Market
Settlement Periods Monthly Hourly
Market Operator Operates Settlement only Day-Ahead Market, 
Forwards Markets and all 
Settlements
System Operator Operates Day-Ahead Planning 
and Real Time 
Balancing Market
Real Time Balancing Market 
(Ancillary Services Market)
Financial Forwards Market No Yes
Table 2. Evolution of wholesale prices in Turkish electricity market (YKr/kWh)
Month
System Imbalance Price Turkish Average Electricity 
Wholesale PriceDaytime Peak Night
January 2006 14,38 14,48 6,68 9,13
February 2006 8,85 10,55 7,59 9,13
March 2006 14,61 15,38 14,80 9,13
April 2006 5,67 6,81 5,77 9,13
May 2006 7,56 9,61 7,23 9,13
June 2006 8,69 9,89 7,96 9,13
July 2006 10,28 11,50 8,85 9,13
August 2006 14,13 13,26 11,13 9,13
September 2006 13,82 13,15 11,67 9,13
October 2006 9,98 9,69 9,85 9,13
November 2006 11,16 13,06 9,47 9,13
December 2006 11,19 15,99 7,41 9,13
January 2007 13,70 12,14 12,62 9,67
February 2007 12,89 12,25 10,97 9,67
March 2007 13,13 9,83 11,50 9,67
April 2007 13,90 12,99 13,03 9,67
May 2007 12,69 11,43 10,95 9,67
June 2007 14,64 14,25 12,50 9,67
July 2007 15,04 15,41 14,37 9,67
August 2007 14,53 15,92 11,40 9,67
September 2007 11,70 13,97 9,86 9,67
October 2007 9,89 11,80 6,85 9,67
November 2007 14,48 15,79 10,70 9,67
December 2007 14,82 16,70 11,40 9,67
January 2008 16,91 17,77 14,86 9,53
February 2008 17,05 17,70 15,38 9,53
March 2008 16,55 17,59 14,50 9,53
April 2008 16,62 17,58 13,39 9,53
May 2008 16,76 17,66 14,96 9,53
June 2008 16,56 17,74 12,92 9,53
July 2008 18,82 18,01 15,59 10,74
August 2008 18,32 18,17 15,46 10,74
September 2008 15,30 16,72 14,29 10,74
October 2008 14,28 17,02 8,98 14,39
November 2008 16,50 18,17 14,67 14,39
Table 3. Evolution of the share of bilateral contracts in total transactions 
(September 2006 - May 2008)
Number of 
Connection 
Units based on 
Bilateral  
Contracts
% in 
Total
Total Amount of 
Transactions based 
on Bilateral  
Contracts (MWh)
% in 
Total
Number of 
Total 
Connection 
Units
Total Amount of 
Transactions 
(MWh)
September 2006 799 58,6 1.259.223 10,2 1364 12.293.743
October 2006 592 51,5 1.057.216 9,1 1.150 11.659.127
November 2006 548 49,5 986.827 7,6 1.107 12.961.008
December 2006 518 48,2 1.010.064 7,3 1.074 13.906.275
January 2007 505 48,0 966.152 7,1 1.052 13.600.214
February 2007 495 47,3 829.330 6,6 1.046 12.567.699
March 2007 468 45,9 966.398 7,1 1.020 13.571.828
April 2007 464 45,4 959.295 7,4 1.022 12.944.182
May 2007 338 37,7 948.410 7,2 897 13.087.525
June 2007 329 37,0 942.218 7,0 889 13.513.351
July 2007 294 34,6 950.071 6,3 850 15.160.019
August 2007 287 34,0 923.582 6,0 843 15.356.342
September 2007 279 33,6 852.954 6,3 831 13.520.241
October 2007 271 32,8 800.857 6,3 826 12.807.364
November 2007 243 30,5 750.425 5,4 796 13.879.871
December 2007 239 30,1 700.618 4,8 793 14.546.282
January 2008 234 30,0 652.371 4,2 780 15.556.901
February 2008 231 29,8 644.308 4,5 775 14.349.853
March 2008 225 29,3 781.713 5,5 768 14.167.493
April 2008 ? - ? - ? ?
May 2008 215 28,4 786.506 5,6 758 14.112.750
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Electricity market models : 8
Figure 2. Projected market structure for the final wholesale electricity market 
in Turkey : 10
Figure 3. Evolution of wholesale prices in Turkish electricity market (YKr/kWh) : 13
Figure 4. Share of transactions based on bilateral contracts within total 
transactions (%) : 14
Figure 5. Evolution of transactions based on bilateral contracts : 14
Figure 1. Electricity market models
NETA, UK Europe
Electricity Market Models
Single - Price
Market Model
Current
Model
Pool Model Bilateral Contracts    
+ Balancing Market
Central DispatchSelf-Dispatch
Final
Target
USA
Unit 
Based
Portfolio
Based
Dual - Price
Market Model
Pre NETA UK
Figure 2. Projected market structure for the final wholesale electricity 
market in Turkey
Delivery 
Day
Years/Months/Weeks 
Ahead
Bilateral Contracts
T
Real Time
Day-Ahead
Market Operator
(MFSC)
System 
Operator 
(MFSC)
Financial
Market
Spot Market
Balancing 
Market
1. Forwards
2. Futures 
3. Options
Market 
Operator 
(MFSC)
-Settlement of 
Balancing activities 
-Settlement of 
Imbalance
T-2 T-1
Figure 3. Evolution of wholesale prices in Turkish electricity market (YKr/kWh)
BSS initiated
Figure 4. Share of transactions based on bilateral contracts within total transactions (%)
Figure 5. Evolution of transactions based on bilateral contracts
